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1.- Introduction 
The word ‘information’ refers to a polysemantic concept associated with very different phenomena, 
such as communication, knowledge, reference and meaning (Floridi 2010, 2011). In the discussions 
about this matter, the first distinction to be introduced is that between a semantic view, according to 
which information carries semantic content and, thus, is related to notions as reference and meaning, 
and a statistical view, concerned with the statistical properties of a system and/or the correlations 
between the states of two systems. Although the locus classicus of the statistical concept is the 
famous article by Claude Shannon (1948), there are many other formal concepts of information, 
such as the Fisher information (see Fisher 1925), or the algorithmic information (Chaitin 1987). 
However, the problems of interpretation do not disappear even when the attention is restricted to a 
single formal concept (see Lombardi, Holik and Vanni 2014). 
During the last decades, new interpretive problems have arisen with the advent of quantum 
information, which combine the difficulties in the understanding of the concept of information with 
the well-known foundational puzzles derived from quantum mechanics itself. This situation 
contrasts with the huge development of the research field named ‘quantum information’, where new 
formal results multiply rapidly. In this context, the question ‘What is quantum information?’ is still 
far from having an answer on which the whole quantum information community agrees. In fact, the 
positions about the matter range from those who seem to deny the existence of quantum information 
(Duwell 2003), those who consider that it refers to information when it is encoded in quantum 
systems (Caves and Fuchs 1996), and those who conceive it as a new kind of information absolutely 
different than Shannon information (Jozsa 1998; Brukner and Zeilinger 2001). 
In the present article we will address the question ‘What is quantum information?’ from a 
conceptual viewpoint. For this purpose, in Section 2 Schumacher’s formalism is introduced by 
contrast with Shannon’s theory. In Section 3 the definition of quantum information in terms of a 
quantum source is discussed. Section 4 is devoted to analyze the definition of information in terms 
of coding theorems. These tasks lead us to focus on the relationship between Shannon entropy and 
von Neumann entropy in Section 5, and to discuss the differences between the concepts of bit and 
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qubit in Section 6. In the light of these arguments, in Section 7 we will endow the phenomenon of 
teleportation with a reading different than usual. The traditional assumption that quantum 
information is inextricably linked to quantum mechanics is considered in Section 8. The previous 
discussions will allow us, in Section 9 to analyze the different interpretations of the concept 
information, in the search of a characterization adequate to Shannon’s and to Schumacher’s 
formalism. Finally, in Section 10 we will draw our conclusions, whose core is the idea that there is 
not a quantum information as qualitatively different than Shannon information. 
2.- Shannon and Schumacher 
Shannon’s theory is presented in the already classical paper “The Mathematical Theory of 
Communication” (1948, see also Shannon and Weaver 1949), where a general communication 
system consists of five parts:  
 A message source A, which generates the message to be received at the destination. 
 A transmitter T, which turns the message generated at the source into a signal to be 
transmitted. In the cases in which the information is encoded, coding is also implemented by 
this system. 
 A channel C, that is, the medium used to transmit the signal from the transmitter to the 
receiver. 
 A receiver R, which reconstructs the message from the signal. 
 A message destination B, which receives the message. 
 
 
 
The message source A is a system of n states ia , which can be thought as the letters of an alphabet 
 1,...,A nA a a , each with its own probability ( )ip a ; the sequences of N states-letters are called 
messages. Analogously, the message destination B is a system of m states jb , letters of an alphabet 
 1,...,B mA b b , each with its own probability. On the basis of these elements, the entropies of the 
source ( )H A  and of the destination ( )H B  can be computed as: 
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and are measured in bits when the logarithm to base 2 is used. When log ( )i iH p a   is defined as 
the individual entropy corresponding to individual state ia  of the message source, the entropy 
A T R B      C message signal message signal
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( )H A  turns out to be “the average of these iH  weighted in accordance with the probability of 
occurrence of the states in question” (Shannon 1948, p. 396). On this basis, it is natural to interpret 
iH  as a measure of the information generated at the source A by the occurrence of ia , and ( )H A  as 
the average amount of information produced at A. The aim of communication is to identify the 
message produced at the source by means of the message received at the destination. 
The entropies ( )H A  and ( )H B  are related through the mutual information ( ; )H A B , that is, 
the information generated at A and received at B, which can be computed as: 
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where the equivocation E is the information generated at A but not received at B, and the noise N is 
the information received at B but not generated at A. In turn, the channel C is defined by the matrix 
( )j ip b a   , where ( )j ip b a  is the conditional probability of the occurrence of jb  at B given that 
ia  occurred at A, and the elements in any row add up to 1. The largest amount of information that 
can be transmitted over C is measured by the channel capacity CC, defined as: 
( )max ( ; )ip aCC H A B          (3) 
where the maximum is taken over all the possible distributions ( )ip a  at A. 
The transmitter T encodes the messages produced by the message source: coding is a mapping 
from the source alphabet  1,...,A nA a a  to the set of finite length strings of symbols from the code 
alphabet  1,...,C qA c c , also called code-words. Whereas the number n of the letters of AA  is 
usually any number, the code alphabet CA  is more often binary: 2q  . In this case, the symbols are 
binary digits (binary alphabet symbols). On the other hand, the code alphabet CA  can be physically 
implemented by means of systems of q states.  
The code-words do not have the same length: the code word iw , corresponding to the letter 
ia , has a length il . Therefore, coding is a fixed- to variable-length mapping. The average code-
word length can be defined as: 
1
( )
n
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l p a l
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l  indicates the compactness of the code: the lower the value of l , the greater the efficiency of 
the coding, that is, fewer resources L N l  are needed to encode the messages of length N. The 
Noiseless-Channel Coding Theorem (First Shannon Theorem) proves that, for sufficiently long 
messages ( N  ), there is an optimal coding process such that the average length L of the coded 
message is as close as desired to a lower bound minL  computed as  
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When the code alphabet has two symbols, then min ( )L NH A . The proof of the theorem is based on 
the fact that the messages of N letters produced by the message source A fall into two classes: one 
of them consisting of ( )2NH A  typical messages, and the other composed of the atypical messages. 
When N  , the probability of an atypical message becomes negligible; so, the source can be 
conceived as producing only ( )2NH A  possible messages. This suggests a natural strategy for coding: 
each typical message is coded by a binary sequence of length ( )NH A , in general shorter than the 
length N  of the original message. 
This formalism has received and still receives different interpretations. Some authors 
conceive Shannon information as a physical magnitude, whereas others consider that the primary 
meaning of the concept of information is always linked with the notion of knowledge (we will come 
back to this point in Section 9). In this section we do not dwell on this issue, but will only focus on 
the similarities and the differences between Shannon information and quantum information. 
Although there were many works on the matter before the article of Benjamin Schumacher 
(1995) “Quantum Coding”, it is usually considered the first precise formalization of the quantum 
information theory. The main aim of the article is to prove a theorem for quantum coding analogous 
to the noiseless coding theorem of Shannon’s theory. With this purpose, Schumacher considers a 
message source A is a system of n states-letters ia , each with its own probability ( )ip a ; then, A has 
a Shannon entropy ( )H A  computed as in eq.(1). In turn, the transmitter T maps the set of the states-
letters ia  of the source A onto a set of n states ia  of a system M. The states ia  belong to a 
Hilbert space M  of dimension  dim M d  and may be non-orthogonal. The mixture of states 
of the signal source M can be represented by a density operator: 
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whose von Neumann entropy is: 
( ) ( log )S Tr              (7) 
In the case that the ia  are mutually orthogonal, then the von Neumann entropy is equal to the 
Shannon entropy: ( ) ( )S H A  . In the general case, ( ) ( )S H A  . 
Given the above mapping, the messages  1 2, ,...,i i iNa a a  of N letters produced by the message 
source A are encoded by means of sequences of N states  1 2, ,...,i i iNa a a , with  1, 2,...,i n . 
This sequence can be represented by the state 1 2, ,...,i i iNa a a   of a system NM , belonging to a 
Hilbert space ...   (  times)N M M MM N       , of dimension Nd . This state is transmitted 
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through a channel C composed of L two-state systems Q called qubits, each represented in a Hilbert 
space Q  of dimension 2. Therefore, the Hilbert space of the channel will be 
...   (  times)C Q Q Q L       , of dimension 2L . Analogously to the Shannon case, L 
indicates the compactness of the code: the lower the value of L, the greater the efficiency of the 
coding, that is, fewer qubits are needed to encode the messages. The Quantum Noiseless-Channel 
Coding Theorem proves that, for sufficiently long messages, the optimal number minL  of qubits 
necessary to transmit the messages generated by the source with vanishing error is given by ( )NS  .  
Schumacher designs the proof of the theorem by close analogy with the corresponding 
Shannon’s theorem. Again, the idea is that all the possible states   (representing the messages of 
N letters produced by the message source A), belonging to NM  of dimension log2N N dd  , fall 
into to classes: one of typical states belonging to a subspace of NM  of dimension ( )2NS  , and the 
other of atypical messages. When N  , the probability of an atypical state becomes negligible; 
so, the source can be conceived as producing only messages represented by states belonging to a 
subspace of ( )2NS  . Therefore, the channel can be designed to be represented in a Hilbert space C  
such that   ( )dim 2 2L NSC     , and this means that the minimum number minL  of qubits 
necessary to transmit the messages of the source is min ( )L NS  . 
Schumacher’s formalism is elegant and clear; nevertheless, disagreements begin when it is 
endowed with different readings. 
3.- Two kinds of source, two kinds of information? 
Christopher Timpson characterizes information as classical or quantum depending on the kind of 
source that produces it: “If classical informationt [information in its technical sense] is what is 
produced by a classical informationt source the Shannon prototype then quantum informationt is 
what is produced by a quantum informationt source” (Timpson 2008, p. 24, emphasis in the original; 
see also Timpson 2004, 2013). According to Timpson, this is part of the analogical strategy 
followed by Schumacher: “Schumacher followed Shannon’s lead: consider a device —a quantum 
source—which, rather than outputting systems corresponding to elements of a classical alphabet, 
produces systems in particular quantum states 
ix
  with probabilities ( )ip x .” (Timpson 2006, p. 
593). 
Of course, this characterization preserves an elegant symmetry between Shannon’s and 
Schumacher’s proposals. However, when Schumacher’s article is read with care, one can see that 
this is not what the author says. On the contrary, Schumacher begins by defining the message 
source A that produces each ia  with probability ( )ip a , and only in the stage of coding he 
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introduces the quantum signal source, which “is a device that codes each message Ma  from the 
source A into a "signal state" Ma  of a quantum system M.” (Schumacher 1995, p. 2738). This 
means that the quantum states involved in the process described by Schumacher do not come from a 
message source, but from a quantum system M that is part of the device that encodes the messages 
produced by the message source and turns them into signals to be transmitted through the channel. 
In other words, the quantum system M is part of what Shannon called ‘transmitter’. This remark is 
in agreement with what is suggested by the title itself of Schumacher’s article: “Quantum Coding” 
and not “Quantum Information”. 
Against those who conceive quantum information as something radically different than 
Shannon information (see, for example, Jozsa 1998, Brukner and Zeilinger 2001), the above 
considerations tend to support the position according to which, strictly speaking, there are not two 
kinds of information: ‘quantum information’ is only a confusing way of talking about information 
encoded by quantum means. This is the position adopted by Caves and Fuchs when stating that 
“Quantum information refers to the distinctive information-processing properties of quantum 
systems, which arise when information is stored in or retrieved from nonorthogonal quantum 
states” (Caves and Fuchs 1996, p. 226). 
Somebody could reject the above position by quoting Schumacher who, after stressing the 
difference between copying and transposition, says that “We can therefore imagine a 
communication scheme based upon transposition. At the coding end, the signal of a source system 
M is transposed via the unitary evolution U into the coding system X. The system X is conveyed 
from the transmitter to the receiver. At the decoding end, the unitary evolution U' is employed to 
recover the signal state from X into M', an identical copy of system M ” (Schumacher 1995, p. 
2741). A light reading of this fragment may interpret it as talking about the information generated 
by M and arriving at M’; a kind of information that is quantum because generated by the quantum 
source M. However, this is not the proper reading. As it is clear in the above quote, the system X “is 
conveyed from the transmitter to the receiver”, not from the message source A and the message 
destination B. Moreover, the system M is at the coding end and the system M’ is at the decoding 
end; so, M is not the message source A. Again, as the title of the paper expresses, here the focus is 
on the stages of coding in the transmitter, transmitting through the channel, and decoding at the 
receiver: there is no quantum source of quantum information that produces quantum states as 
messages: the quantum state   is not the message but the signal. 
The assumption that the system M is the quantum source of information, as if the quantum 
states produced by it were the letters of the messages, leads to suppose that the aim of 
communication is to the transposition of the state generated at M into M'. On this basis, Timpson 
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states that what we want to transmit is not the sequence of states itself, but another token of the 
same type: “one should distinguish between the concrete systems that the source outputs and the 
type that this output instantiates.” (Timpson 2004, p. 22; see also Timpson 2008). Then, the goal of 
communication, both classical and quantum, is to reproduce at the destination another token of the 
same type: “What will be required at the end of the communication protocol is either that another 
token of this type actually be reproduced at a distant point” (Timpson 2008, p. 25).  
Against these claims, it must be noticed that the goal of any communication is not to 
reproduce at the destination a token of the same type as that produced at the source. As stressed by 
Shannon, in communication “[t]he significant aspect is that the actual message is one selected from 
a set of possible messages.” (1948, p. 379, emphasis in the original). Any communication engineer 
knows that the states jb  of the destination system B can be states of any kind, completely different 
than the states ia  of the source system A: the goal of communication is to identify at the destination 
which sequence of states ia  was produced by the message source A. For instance, the message 
source may be a dice and the message destination a dash of lights; or the message source may be a 
device that produces words in English and the message destination a device that operates a machine. 
A face of a dice and a light in a dash cannot be conceived as tokens of a same type without 
depriving the distinction type-token of any philosophical content and conceptual usefulness (for a 
detailed criticism, see Lombardi, Fortin and López 2014). The idea that successful communication 
needs to reproduce at the destination the same type-state as that produced at the source seems to be 
the result of focusing on the quantum case, and confusing the message source with the system M, 
which is not the message source but a part of the signal source belonging to the transmitter. 
In the same sense, it is important not to confuse the success of communication with the 
fidelity of the process of transposition, defined as (Schumacher 1995, p. 2742): 
1
( )
n
i i i i
i
F p a a a
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where the i ia a  correspond to the signal states produced at M, and the i  represent the signal 
states obtained at M’ as the result of the transposition, which do not need to be pure. Fidelity 
measures the effectiveness of the stage of transmission through the channel, and it is a property of 
the channel: the fidelity of a transmission is less than unity when the channel is limited in the sense 
that    dim dim NC M   (although indefinitely close to unity when   ( )dim 2NSC    , as proved 
by the quantum coding theorem). The success of communication, on the contrary, is defined by a 
one-to-one (or even a one-to-many) mapping from the set of states-letters of the message source 
and the set of states-letters of the message destination, which makes possible to identify at the 
destination the state-letter occurred at the message source. This mapping is completely conventional 
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and depends on the particular application at task. Of course, how successful a certain situation of 
communication based on quantum transposition is will be function of the fidelity of the 
transposition, but also of the reliability of the operations of coding and decoding, which correlate 
the states ia  of the message source A with the quantum states ia  of M, and the quantum states iw  
of M’ and the states ib  of the destination B, respectively. In other words, the approximation to 
success in a particular situation of communication depends on the whole communication 
arrangement, and not only on the transmission stage. The identification of the success of 
communication with the fidelity of transposition (see Duwell 2008 for discussion) runs parallel with 
the identification of the message source with the signal source, and both lead to conclude that 
quantum information is a different kind of information than “classical” Shannon information. 
But the defender of the qualitative peculiarity of quantum information might insist: What 
prevents us to consider M as a quantum source and to define quantum information as what is 
produced by the quantum source? In this case, the goal of communication would be to reproduce at 
the destination M’ the same type-state as that produced at the source M. Of course, definitions are 
conventional, and we can assign names at will. But, this view distorts the very idea of 
communication, which consists in identifying what happens at the message source (what message is 
produced) by means of what happens at the message destination, with no need that the source state 
and the destination state be tokens of the same type. Moreover, if quantum information were what is 
produced by the quantum source which produces quantum states, sending information would turn 
out to be transposing quantum states. In fact, when it is forgotten that transposing is only a part of a 
communication situation and it is disregarded the role played by the message source and the 
message destination, nothing would change in the discourse about quantum information if one 
replaced the term ‘quantum information’ by the term ‘quantum state’. As Armond Duwell clearly 
states, although it can be argued that there are specific properties that motivate a new concept of 
information, different than Shannon’s, when those properties are revised, “[i]t is obvious that there 
is already a concept that covers all of these properties: the quantum state. The term ‘quantum 
information’ is then just a synonym for an old concept” (Duwell 2003, p. 498). Therefore, ‘quantum 
information’ turns out to mean quantum state, but the whole meaningful reference to 
communication gets lost. 
In summary, up to this point there seems to be no reasons to consider that there exists a 
quantum information as qualitatively different than Shannon information. However, as we will see 
in the next section, a further argument has been raised to support the peculiarity of quantum 
information. 
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4.- Two kinds of coding, two kinds of information? 
Another strategy of those who see quantum information as a different and peculiar type of 
information is to link the very meaning of the concept of information with the coding theorems: if 
the theorems are different in the classical and the quantum case, the corresponding concepts of 
information are also different. For instance, Timpson defines the concept of information in terms of 
the noiseless coding theorems: “the coding theorems that introduced the classical (Shannon, 1948) 
and quantum (Schumacher, 1995) concepts of informationt [the technical concept of information] 
do not merely define measures of these quantities. They also introduce the concept of what it is that 
is transmitted, what it is that is measured.” (Timpson 2008, p. 23, emphasis in the original). In other 
words, information measures “the minimal amount of channel resources required to encode the 
output of the source in such a way that any message produced may be accurately reproduced at the 
destination. That is, to ask how much informationt a source produces is ask to what degree is the 
output of the source compressible?” (Timpson 2008, p. 27, emphasis in the original). 
The first thing to notice here is that the strategy of defining Shannon information via the 
noiseless coding theorem turns the theorem into a definition. In fact, now the Shannon entropy 
( )H A  of the message source A is not defined by eq. (1) as the average amount of information per 
letter generated by A, but it is defined as the average number of bits necessary to code a letter of the 
message source A using an ideal code, and eq. (1) becomes a theorem resulting from a mathematical 
proof. In the quantum coding case, the strategy of defining the von Neumann entropy ( )S   in terms 
of Schumacher’s quantum coding theorem is more reasonable because, as argued above, ( )S   plays 
a role in the stage of coding and is a property of the signal source, and not of the message source. 
However, this does not amount to suppose that, in this case, the information generated at the 
message source and to be transmitted to the message destination is measured by ( )S  : once again, 
this is a conclusion derived from improperly identifying the message source with the signal source. 
As explained in Section 2, the coding theorems are proved for the case of very long messages, 
strictly speaking, for messages of length N  . Thus, it says nothing about the relation between 
the information generated at the message source by the occurrence of a single state and the 
resources needed to encode it. Therefore, if the noiseless coding theorems embody the very nature 
of classical and quantum information, it makes no sense to talk about the individual amount of 
information conveyed by a single state. Not only that, but one wonders whether short messages can 
be conceived as embodying information to the extent that they are not covered by the noiseless 
coding theorems. 
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When explaining the elements of the general communication system, Shannon (1948, p. 381) 
characterizes the transmitter as a system that operates on the message coming from the source in 
some way to produce a signal suitable for transmission over the channel. In many cases, as 
telegraphy, the transmitter is also responsible for encoding the source messages. However, in 
certain cases the message is not encoded. For instance, in traditional telephony the transmitter 
operates as a mere transducer, by changing sound pressure into a proportional electrical current. If 
one insists on defining information in terms of the noiseless coding theorems, how to talk about 
information in these situations that do not involve coding?  
Summing up, the strategy of defining information via the noiseless coding theorems conflates 
two aspects of communication that the traditional textbooks urged us not to conceptually confuse: 
the information generated at the message source, which depends on its states and the probability 
distribution over them, and is independent of coding even independent of the very fact that the 
messages are coded or not, and the resources necessary to encode the occurrence of those states, 
which also depends on the particular coding selected (for a more detailed argument, see Lombardi, 
Fortin and López 2014). Given a message source A, the information ( )H A  generated by it can be 
coded in many different ways. Shannon’s noiseless coding theorem says that ( )H A  also measures 
the optimal length of the coded messages when coded by means of classical systems of, say, two 
states; Schumacher’s noiseless coding theorem says that, if quantum systems are used for coding 
instead of classical systems, the optimal coding is measured by ( )S  . And this raises the question 
about the relationship between Shannon entropy and von Neumann entropy.  
5.- The relationship between Shannon entropy and von Neumann entropy 
The first point that is usually stressed is that the von Neumann entropy is, in general, lower than the 
Shannon entropy: 
( ) ( )S H A             (9) 
In turn, the so-called Holevo bound (Holevo 1973) establishes an upper bound for the mutual 
information in the case of quantum coding. When the signal states are pure states ia , the bound is 
given by: 
( ; ) ( )H A B S             (10) 
From a perspective that establishes a clear difference between classical and quantum 
information, Timpson distinguishes between specification information and accessible information. 
Specification information is the amount of information required to specify the sequence of states of 
N two-state systems. Accessible information is the amount of information that can be acquired or 
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read from the sequence by measurement. If the states are non-orthogonal, it is not possible to 
distinguish among them perfectly; therefore, “in the classical case, the two quantities will coincide, 
as classical states are perfectly distinguishable.” (Timpson 2008, p. 4). According to Timpson, this 
distinction can be made only in the case of communication of classical information by means of 
quantum systems, where the specification information is ( )H A , and the accessible information is 
( ; )H A B , whose upper bound is given by ( )S  . But in the strictly quantum case, the distinction 
cannot be made because there is no classical source of information: there is only a quantum source 
producing quantum information measured in qubits: “Thus when talking about the amount of 
information that is associated with a given system, or has been encoded into it, we need to clarify 
whether we are talking about transmitting classical information using quantum systems, or whether 
we are talking about encoding and transmitting quantum information properly so-called. In the 
former context, the notions of specification and accessible information apply: how much classical 
information is required to specify a sequence, or how much classical information one can gain from 
it, respectively; and we know that at most one classical bit can be encoded into a qubit. In the latter 
context, we apply the appropriate measure of the amount of quantum information.” (Timpson 2008, 
p. 5, emphasis in the original). 
This interpretation must face the problem that this is not what Schumacher says in his article. 
As the author clearly explains, ( )H A  is the Shannon entropy of the message source, and the von 
Neumann entropy ( )S   is a property of the signal source in the case of coding by means of 
quantum states. When the signal states ia  are mutually orthogonal, they turn out to be the 
eigenstates of   and the ( )ip a  become its eigenvalues; therefore, ( ) ( )S H A  . When the signal 
states ia  are not mutually orthogonal, in general the ia  have no simple relation with the 
eigenstates of  ; then ( ) ( )S H A  . And the Holevo bound establishes the maximum amount of 
information ( ; )H A B  produced at the message source A and received at the message destination B. 
There are not two possible cases here, one classical with quantum coding, where the Holevo bound 
applies, and another strictly quantum, where the bound does not apply and that is the subject matter 
of quantum information theory. Schumacher’s paper always speaks about a communication 
situation where the outputs of a message source A are coded by means of quantum systems, and 
there is not another situation under consideration by contrast with this one.  
In turn, if the signal states ia  are not orthogonal, it is not possible to distinguish among 
them perfectly by means of measurement. This means that, even if they are transposed with perfect 
fidelity between M and M’, no measure on M’ will be sufficient to recover the states produced in M. 
The process of measuring on M’ consists in the decoding process at the receiver, which aims at 
reconstructing the original message from the signal; then, when the signals states are non-
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orthogonal, such a reconstruction cannot be perfect, and the amount of information produced at the 
message source A and received at the destination B, ( ; )H A B , is less than the amount of information 
( )H A  produced at the message source. When the whole situation is addressed with the conceptual 
tools of abstract communication theory, the conclusion is not surprising: if messages are encoded by 
means of non-orthogonal and then non perfectly distinguishable states, there is a loss of 
information between the message source and the message destination measured by an equivocation 
0E  ; therefore, ( ; ) ( ) ( )H A B H A E H A   . And the Holevo bound gives the bound of this 
information loss, which is not due to a non-perfect fidelity in the transposition of the state through 
the channel, but is the result of an imperfect decoding at the receiver. In this explanation, there is 
still no quantum information as different than classical information and with a conceptual content 
that differs from the meaning of the quantum state itself in some substantial sense. 
6.- Bits and qubits  
In the definition of the Shannon entropy, the choice of a logarithmic base amounts to a choice of a 
unit for measuring information. If the base 2 is used, the resulting unit is called ‘bit’. But the natural 
logarithm can also be used, and in this case the unit of measurement is the nat, contraction of 
natural unit. And when the logarithm to the base 10 is used, the unit is the Hartley. The possibility 
of using different units to quantify information shows the difference between the amount of 
information associated with an event and the value obtained by using a particular unit of 
measurement. 
For a long time it was quite clear in the field of communication engineering that “bit” was a 
unit of measurement, and that the fact that a different unit can be used did not affect the very nature 
of information. However, with the advent of quantum information, the new concept of qubit entered 
the field: a qubit is primarily conceived not as a unit of measurement of quantum information, but 
as a quantum system of two-states used to encode the information of a source. This way of talking 
about qubits has gradually seeped into Shannon’s theory and its talk about bits. This process led to a 
progressive reification of the concept of bit, which now is also and many times primarily 
conceived as referring to a classical system of two states. Some authors still distinguish between the 
two meanings of the concept: “I would like to distinguish two uses of the word “bit.” First, “bit” 
refers to a unit of information that quantifies the uncertainty of two equiprobable choices. Second, 
“bit” also refers to a system that can be in one of two discrete states.” (Duwell 2003, p. 486). But 
nowadays the conflation between the two meanings is much more frequent: “The Shannon 
information ( )H X  measures in bits (classical two-state systems) the resources required to transmit 
all the messages that the source produces.” (Timpson 2006, p. 592). The same confusion appears in 
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the quantum case, where the qubit, besides referring two-state quantum systems, is now also 
conceived as the unit of measurement of the quantum information, quantified by the von Neumann 
entropy: “just as Shannon’s noiseless coding theorem introduces the concept of the bit as a measure 
of information, the quantum noiseless coding theorem introduces the concept of the qubit as a 
measure of quantum information, characterising the quantum source.” (Timpson 2004, p. 26). 
Although very widespread, this undifferentiated use of the term ‘bit’ sounds odd to the ears of 
an old communication engineer, who has the difference between a system and a unit of 
measurement deeply internalized. For him, conflating a bit with a two-state system is like confusing 
a meter with the Prototype Meter bar, an object made of an alloy of platinum and iridium and stored 
in the Bureau International des Poids et Mesures in Sèvres. And asserting that the Shannon 
information ( )H X  gives a measure “in bits (classical two-state systems)” amounts to saying that 
the length L gives a measure “in meters (platinum-iridium bars)”. In order to avoid this kind of 
confusions about the concept of bit, it might be appropriate to follow the suggestion of Carlton 
Caves and Christopher Fuchs (1996), who propose to adopt the term ‘cbit’ to name a two-state 
classical system when used to encode information, by analogy with the term ‘qubit’ that names a 
two-state quantum system involved in quantum coding. This terminology keeps explicit the 
distinction between the quantity of information produced at the message source, which is usually 
measured in bits (but may also be measured in other units), and the systems of q states (usually 
2q  ) used to physically implement coding. 
From this viewpoint, information is always measured in bits, and it is generated by a message 
source A of Shannon entropy ( )H A . In turn, this information can be coded by means of cbits 
(classical two-state systems) or of qubits (quantum two-state systems). The optimal resources 
needed to encode the information (the number of systems required, in average) are given in the first 
case by the Shannon entropy ( )H A  (Shannon’s noiseless coding theorem), and in the second case 
by the von Neumann entropy ( )S   (Schumacher’s noiseless coding theorem). Therefore, all the 
peculiarities with which quantum information is usually endowed are features of the quantum 
coding: “the properties [supposedly specific of quantum information] depend on the type of 
physical system used to store information, not on new properties of information” (Duwell 2003, p. 
481).  
The arguments of the last four sections lead us to the following remark. It is clear that, in his 
famous article, Schumacher exploits the analogy between Shannon’s theory and his new proposal. 
But the analogy is focused on the coding-transmitting-decoding stage: the transmitter-channel-
receiver part of the communication arrangement in Shannon’s general characterization. 
Schumacher’s purpose is to formulate a quantum coding theorem whose demonstration runs parallel 
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to that of Shannon’s noiseless coding theorem. However, this analogy is usually extended beyond 
its original scope. This extension introduces the concept of quantum source as the parallel of the 
supposedly classical source (the message source), and conceives the von Neumann entropy ( )S   as 
the quantum equivalent of the Shannon entropy ( )H S : ( )S   would measure in qubits the quantum 
information generated by the quantum source, as ( )H S  measures in bits the classical information 
generated by the classical source; and the quantum coding theorem would show that ( )S   
establishes the optimal resources needed to code quantum information as the classical coding 
theorem shows that ( )H S  establishes the resources needed to code classical information. This close 
parallelism is certainly very appealing, but does not agree with the content of the article that 
supposedly laid the foundations of quantum information theory. And if, pace Schumacher, one tries 
to defend the extended analogy, the concept of quantum information becomes indistinguishable 
from that of quantum state and loses its connection with the general idea of communication that 
should support it. 
7.- What is transferred in teleportation? 
Teleportation is one of the most discussed issues in the field of quantum information. Although a 
direct result of quantum mechanics, it appears as a weird phenomenon when described as a process 
of transmission of information. Broadly speaking, an unknown quantum state   is transferred 
from Alice to Bob with the assistance of a shared pair of particles prepared in an entangled state and 
of two classical bits sent from Alice to Bob (the description of the protocol can be found in any 
textbook on the matter; see, e.g., Nielsen and Chuang 2010). In general, the idea is that a very large 
(strictly infinite) amount of information is transferred from Alice to Bob by sending only two bits 
through a classical channel. 
In his detailed analysis of teleportation, Timpson (2006) poses the two central questions of the 
debate: “First, how is so much information transported? And second, most pressingly, just how does 
the information get from Alice to Bob?” (Timpson 2006, p. 596). We will consider the two 
questions from the viewpoint developed in the previous sections.  
Regarding to the first question, it is usually said that the amount of information generated at 
the source is, in principle, infinite, because two real numbers are necessary to specify the state   
among the infinite states of the Hilbert space. Even in the case that a coarse-graining is introduced 
in the Hilbert space, the amount of information is immensely greater than the two bits sent through 
the classical channel. This great amount of information cannot be transported by the two classical 
bits that Alice sends to Bob. So, how is so much information transported? Timpson’s answer to this 
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first problem is based on the supposed difference between classical information encoded in 
quantum systems and quantum information. In the classical case, he relies on the distinction 
between specification information and accessible information: although the specification 
information the information necessary to specify the state is very large, or even infinite, the 
accessible information the information that Bob can retrieve by measurement is always limited 
by the Holevo bound, which “restricts the amount of information that Bob may acquire to a 
maximum of one bit of information per qubit, that is, to a maximum of one bit of information per 
successful run of the teleportation protocol.” (Timpson 2006, p. 595). 
However, this answer leaves us with many conceptual questions. If the qualitative difference 
between classical and quantum information is accepted, it seems that only the classical information 
needed to specify the state is infinite, and it is this classical information that is inaccessible at Bob’s 
end. But, what about quantum information? How much quantum information is transferred? The 
answer seems to be: one qubit per successful run of the teleportation protocol. But if the term 
‘qubit’ refers to a two-state quantum system, we cannot say that a qubit was transferred: there is no 
quantum system that Alice sends to Bob (Figure 1 in Timpson 2006 shows the contrary: it is Bob 
who sends one of the subsystems of the maximally entangled state to Alice). Perhaps ‘qubit’ has to 
be understood in its other meaning, that is, as the unit of measurement of the quantum information 
carried by  , quantified by the von Neumann entropy ( )S  . But this does not dispel our 
perplexity, since the von Neumann entropy ( )S   corresponding to the state   is zero, because   
is a pure state. On the other hand, what is the amount of the classical information generated at the 
source, and quantified by the Shannon entropy ( )H A ? In order to compute it, it is necessary to 
count with the distribution of probability over the possible states of the source, since ( )H A  depends 
essentially on that distribution: a source might have infinite states such that only one of them has 
non-zero probability; in this case, ( )H A  would be zero. These remarks show that it makes no sense 
to describe a phenomenon as teleportation in informational terms if the message source, with its 
possible states and their probabilities, is not clearly characterized. Only on the basis of such 
characterization one can talk meaningfully about the amount of information ( )H A  measured in 
bits of the message source, and about the entropy ( )S   measured in qubits of the signal source 
that produces the quantum states to be teleported in the successive runs of the protocol.  
Let us now consider the second question: how does the information get from Alice to Bob? In 
traditional communication, the information is always transferred from the transmitter to the receiver 
by some physical carrier. But it is usually assumed that in teleportation there is no physical carrier 
between Alice and Bob other than that represented by the two classical bits that Alice sends to Bob. 
This has lead many physicists to search for the physical link that can play the role of the carrier of 
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information. For Richard Jozsa (1998, 2004), quantum information is a new kind of information, 
which has an amazing non-classical property: it may flow backwards in time. In teleportation, the 
information travels backwards in time to the event at which the entangled pair was produced and 
then travels forwards to the future (see also Penrose 1998). According to David Deutsch and Patrick 
Hayden (2000), the quantum information travels hidden in the classical bits. In order to avoid these 
views, Timpson cuts the Gordian knot of teleportation by adopting a deflationary view of 
information, according to which “there is not a question of information being a substance or entity 
that is transported, nor of ‘the information’ being a referring term.” (2006, p. 599); therefore, the 
only meaningful issue in teleportation is about the physical processes involved in the protocol. 
Perhaps the exotic explanations of teleportation can be avoided without depriving the concept 
of information of any content, if the full communication situation is considered. In fact, 
communication requires a message source A that produces letters, which are coded by means of 
quantum states at the signal source M, which, in turn, produces the signal to be transferred to the 
receiver. In this communication framework, it can be seen that teleportation is a phenomenon that 
corresponds to the stage of transmission. In particular, it is a case of what Schumacher called 
‘transposition’: “"quantum teleportation" […] is a rather exotic example of a transposition 
process” (Schumacher 1995, p. 2741). But, as explained in Section 3, transposition is not the 
transmission of the information generated at the message source A to the destination end B; it is the 
transference of the signal from the transmitter to the receiver. In this case, the signal is the quantum 
state  , which cannot be copied into the receiver M’, but can be transposed with a fidelity F. In 
other words, teleportation is a physical process that allows a quantum state to be transferred 
between two quantum systems without leaving a copy behind, and this process does not need to be 
conceptualized in informational terms to be understood. In other words, teleportation could be 
explained with absolutely no reference to information. Therefore, if there is a puzzle in teleportation, 
it is the old quantum puzzle embodied in non-locality, and not a new mystery about a new kind of 
information. Again, when the discourse about quantum information is properly debugged, the 
concept of ‘quantum information’ has no different content than that of the concept of quantum state. 
8.- Quantum states or non-orthogonal states? 
According to several authors (Timpson 2003; Duwell 2003; Lombardi 2004; Lombardi, Fortin and 
Vanni 2014), the information appearing in Shannon’s theory and measured by the Shannon entropy 
is not classical, but is neutral with respect to the physical theory that describes the systems used for 
its implementation. Armond Duwell expresses very clearly this idea: “The Shannon theory is a 
theory about the statistical properties of a communication system. Once the statistical properties of 
 17
a communication system are specified, all information-theoretic properties of the communication 
system are fixed. […] Hence, the Shannon theory can be applied to any communication system 
regardless whether its parts are best described by classical mechanics, classical electrodynamics, 
quantum theory, or any other physical theory.” (Duwell 2003, p. 480). By contrast, quantum 
information is usually presented as inextricably linked to quantum mechanics. For instance, on the 
basis of identifying the success of communication with the fidelity of transposition (recall our 
criticism to that identification in Section 3), Duwell claims that “[t]he distance between Shannon 
information theory and quantum information theory concerns the nature of success criteria for the 
two theories. Quantum information theory, with its standard correspondence rules (that states 
describe states of quantum systems), has a very natural success criterion.” (Duwell 2008, p. 213). 
The idea that quantum mechanics dictates the need of a new kind of information is very common in 
the physicist community: “One of the most fascinating aspects of recent work in fundamental 
quantum theory is the emergence of a new notion, the concept of quantum information, which is 
quite distinct from its classical counterpart” (Jozsa 1998, p. 49). In other words, even for those who 
admit that Shannon information is theoretically neutral, quantum information seems to be 
essentially tied to quantum mechanics. 
This view about quantum information finds the specificity of this kind of information in a 
well-known property of quantum states: their indistinguishability. Non-orthogonal quantum states 
are not distinguishable by measurement: “in contrast to classical systems, quantum measurement 
theory places severe restrictions on the amount of information we can obtain about the identity of a 
given quantum state by performing any conceivable measurement on it.” (Jozsa 1998, p. 50). For 
Timpson, whether the states produced by the respective sources are distinguishable or not is what 
discriminates between the two types of information, classical and quantum: “a distinguishing 
characteristic of classical informationt [the technical concept of information] when compared with 
quantum informationt is that the varying outputs of a classical information source are 
distinguishable one from another” (Timpson 2008, p. 24). These are only two examples of the 
widespread way of sorting the concepts involved to the field of information into two groups: 
classical-orthogonal-distinguishable and quantum-non-orthogonal-indistinguishable. 
Once this difference between “classical” Shannon information and quantum information is 
accepted, the following step is to compare and relate them to each other. An idea that pervades the 
bibliography on the subject is that, since for a mixture of orthogonal states ( ) ( )S H A  , Shannon 
information is a particular case of quantum information: it is the case in which the states are 
distinguishable. Jeffrey Bub expresses this view: “[c]lassical information is that sort of information 
represented in a set of distinguishable states states of classical systems, or orthogonal quantum 
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states and so can be regarded as a subcategory of quantum information, where the states may or 
may not be distinguishable.” (Bub 2007, p. 576). Or, the other way around, von Neumann entropy is 
conceived “as a generalization of the notion of Shannon entropy.” (Bub 2007, p. 576). 
These claims, although seemingly clear when considered individually, lead us to some 
perplexities when taken together: if classical information is a subcategory of quantum information, 
classical information is also quantum? So, why “classical” information is classical? Do we need to 
assume that classical physics arises as the classical limit of quantum mechanics? On the other hand, 
if classical information is a particular case of quantum information, then, pace Duwell (2003), 
strictly speaking what really exist is quantum information and not classical information. In turn, if 
quantum information turns out to be the most general concept of information and, at the same time, 
it is really essentially tied to quantum mechanics, any attempt to reconstruct quantum mechanics in 
informational terms runs the risk of becoming circular. A way of avoiding circularity is to use a 
concept of information more general than that involved in Shannon and Schumacher formalisms, as 
in the case of the CBH characterization of quantum theory (Clifton, Bub and Halvorson 2003). This 
confusing picture shows the need of a conceptual and terminological “cleaning” in the field of 
quantum information. 
A starting point for this task is to break the threatening circularity by reconsidering the usually 
acritically accepted link between quantum information and quantum mechanics. Let us suppose for 
a moment that quantum information is information represented in non-orthogonal states, does it 
make quantum information quantum? Certainly, in general quantum states are non-orthogonal, but 
the opposite is not true: non-orthogonal states can be also defined in a classical framework. In fact, 
as Wayne Myrvold (2010) stresses, some features traditionally considered as peculiarly quantum 
can be recovered in a formalism that deals with classical mixed states defined as probability 
measures over a classical phase space (or in the Hilbert space formalism of classical statistical 
mechanics, see Koopman 1931). In particular, two classical mixtures can be defined as orthogonal 
if and only if their supports are disjoint. Furthermore, even the no-cloning theorem, originally 
obtained in the quantum context (Dieks 1982, Wootters and Zurek 1982; see the extension to 
mixtures in Barnum et al. 1996), can be proved in the classical statistical domain by taking 
overlapping probability distributions with non-trivial supports as dynamical variables (Daffertshofer, 
Plastino and Plastino 2002; see discussion in Teh 2012).  
These results suggest that, at the end of the day, quantum information is not as quantum as 
originally supposed. In fact, Schumacher formalism could be repeated without using the term 
‘quantum’, by talking only about states belonging to a Hilbert space (such as it was introduced in 
Section 2), with no reference to a specific physical theory. Once this is acknowledged, it is not 
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difficult to conceptually imagine that, in a counterfactual history, “quantum” information could be 
developed in the nineteenth century, in terms of, say, Gaussian functions with disjoint supports on a 
phase space. 
Somebody might retort, following Schrödinger (1936), that the essential difference between 
the classical and the quantum is located in entanglement. However, in the first place it has to be 
recalled that there are “classical” simulations of quantum mechanics that recover the main features 
of the theory (see, e.g. Aerts 1988), even regarding entanglement (Collins and Popescu 2002). 
However, this is not the most important point of the argument. The main issue here is the role 
played by entanglement in Schumacher’s proposal. As argued in the previous section, in this case 
communication takes advantage of entanglement to implement transposition, and transposition is a 
physical process that allows the signal to be transferred between two systems without leaving a 
copy behind. However, this does not mean that any transposition process needs to be implemented 
by entanglement. Schumacher is explicit about this point: “The system X is conveyed from the 
transmitter to the receiver. […] The system X is the quantum channel in this communication 
scheme, and supports the transposition of the state of M into M’.” (Schumacher 1995, p. 2741). As 
it is quite clear, transposition needs the signal to be conveyed from the transmitted to the receiver, 
but such a goal can be met by sending a physical system X from the two ends by “standard” ways, 
without resorting to entanglement. Therefore, even accepting that entanglement is the hallmark of 
the quantum, it is not essential to Schumacher theory, which can be implemented on the basis of a 
traditional channel. 
The conclusion drawn from this argument is that there is no difference between “classical” 
information and “quantum” information regarding the physical substrata that implement them. 
Analogously to the case of Shannon’s theory, which is not classical but theoretically neutral, the 
same can be said about Schumacher’s theory: it is not quantum, but neutral with respect to the 
physical theory that describes the systems used for its implementation. When this conclusion is 
combined with our previous claim that there is no quantum information as different than classical 
information, information theory acquires a much simpler and clearer presentation, where the terms 
‘classical’ and ‘quantum’ disappear. A message source A produce messages that carry information 
neither classical nor quantum, whose average amount is measured by the Shannon entropy 
( )H A . The messages so produced enter the transmitter, which in general encodes them by means 
of a signal source M that produces signals. Coding can be performed by means of orthogonal or 
non-orthogonal states. In the orthogonal case, Shannon’s coding theorem relates the Shannon 
entropy ( )H A  with the optimal coding. In the non-orthogonal case, Schumacher’s coding theorem 
introduces the von Neumann entropy ( )S   of the mixture of states of the signal source M as the 
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relevant magnitude that gives the optimal coding. The signals are then transmitted between 
transmitter and receiver through the communication channel, which can be implemented in different 
ways. Fidelity measures the effectiveness of the signal transmission through the channel, between 
the signal source M and the system M’ at the receiver end. The system M’ performs a decoding 
process that turns the signals into messages, which finally arrive to the message destination B. The 
success of communication, defined by a one-to-one or a one-to-many mapping from the set of 
states-letters of the message source A and the set of states-letters of the message destination B, can 
be quantified in terms of the mutual information ( ; )H A B .  
In this completely abstract characterization, it makes sense to say that the theoretical tools 
used in non-orthogonal coding are the most general, since they can represent the orthogonal coding 
situation as a particular case, when ( ) ( )S H A  . On the other hand, when information theory is 
understood independently of the physical systems that materialize communication, then the attempts 
to reconstruct quantum mechanics on the basis of informational constraints (Fuchs 2002; Clifton, 
Bub and Halvorson 2003) acquire a strong conceptual appealing. In fact, if information is a concept 
that can be formally defined and theoretically treated independently of any particular theory of 
physics, then the reconstruction of quantum mechanics in terms of that concept presents the theory 
in a completely new light. Moreover, the reconstruction of different physical theories on the same 
neutral informational basis, if possible, would allow them to be meaningfully compared without 
reductionist prejudices.  
In summary, conceiving the concept of information as independent from physical theories 
contributes to the understanding of the subject matter and to dispel confusions. Nevertheless, this 
position does not answer yet the question about the nature of information. 
9.- What is information? 
Once it is accepted that there are not two kinds of information, classical and quantum, the problem 
of interpretation is simpler: now the question about the nature of information is only one. However, 
as we will see, the answer is not just one. 
The notion most usually connected with the concept of information is that of knowledge: 
information provides knowledge, modifies the state of knowledge of those who receive it. For 
instance, Fred Dretske adopts an epistemic interpretation when he states that: “information is a 
commodity that, given the right recipient, is capable of yielding knowledge.” (1981, p. 47); in a 
similar trend, Jon Dunn defines information as “what is left of knowledge when one takes away 
belief, justification and truth” (2001, p. 423). Some authors believe that the link between 
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information and knowledge is a feature of the everyday notion of information and not of the 
technical concept (see Timpson 2004, 2013). However, the literature shows that this is not the case: 
physicists frequently speak about what we know or may know when dealing with information. For 
instance, Zeilinger equates information and knowledge when he says that “[w]e have knowledge, 
i.e., information, of an object only through observation” (1999, p. 633) or, with Bruckner, “[f]or 
convenience we will use here not a measure of information or knowledge, but rather its opposite, a 
measure of uncertainty or entropy.” (2009, pp. 681-682). In the quantum context, Christopher 
Fuchs adheres to Bayesianism regarding probabilities and, as a consequence, advocates for an 
epistemic interpretation of information (see, e.g., Caves, Fuchs and Schack 2002). 
Although seemingly safe, the epistemic view leads to perplexities in certain simple situations. 
Let us consider a source S that transmits information to two physically isolated radio receivers RA 
and RB via a physical link (electromagnetic waves). In this case, although there is no physical 
interaction between the two receivers, the correlations between their states are not accidental, but 
they result from the physical dependence of those states on the states of S. Therefore, strictly from 
the epistemic interpretation of information it must be admitted the existence of an informational 
link between the two receivers: it is possible to learn something about RB by looking at RA and vice 
versa. And this holds even in the case that RB is farther from the source S than RA, so that the events 
at RB occur later than those at RA: from the epistemic view, RA carries information about what will 
happen at RB. 
The traditional physical interpretation of information blocks this possibility by conceiving 
information as a physical magnitude (see, e.g., Rovelli 1996). This is the common view of 
communication engineers, for whom the essential feature of information consists in its capacity to 
be generated at one point of the physical space and transmitted to another point; it can also be 
accumulated, stored and converted from one form to another. From this perspective, the link with 
knowledge is not a central issue, since the transmission of information can be used only for control 
purposes, such as operating a device at the destination end by modifying the state of the source. For 
some physicists, information is a physical entity with the same ontological status as energy. It has 
also been claimed that its essential property is the power to manifest itself as structure when added 
to matter (Stonier 1990, 1996).  
In general, the physical interpretation of information appears strongly linked with the idea 
expressed by the well-known dictum ‘no information without representation’: the transmission of 
information between two points of the physical space necessarily requires an information-bearing 
signal, that is, a physical process propagating from one point to the other. Rolf Landauer is an 
explicit defender of this position when he claims that “information is physical” (1991, p. 23): 
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“[i]nformation is not a disembodied abstract entity; it is always tied to a physical representation. It 
is represented by engraving on a stone tablet, a spin, a charge, a hole in a punched card, a mark on 
a paper, or some other equivalent.” (Landauer 1996, p. 188). The need of a carrier signal sounds 
natural in the light of the generic idea that physical influences can only be transferred through 
interactions. On this basis it is clear that, in the situation of the two radio receivers, there is no 
information transmission to the extent that there is no physical signal propagating between them. 
Although the physical interpretation of the concept of information prevailed among physicists 
and communication engineers involved in the traditional applications of Shannon theory, the 
situation began to change with the advent of “quantum information”. In fact, entanglement assisted 
communication shows that, although the mere correlation is not sufficient for communication of 
information, asking for a physical signal acting as a carrier of information from source to 
destination is a too strong requirement. The traditional physical view leads to artificial solutions as 
those of backwards flowing information or of classically hidden information. It is in this sense that 
the possibility of transposition of states via entanglement has philosophical implications: not 
because introduces quantum information as a different kind of information with its own 
peculiarities, but because it shows that the traditional requirement of a carrier signal flowing 
through space is not necessary for transmission of information. 
A defender of the physical view might retort that the difference between information that 
requires a carrier signal through space, which takes a finite amount of time, and information that 
can be transmitted without such a signal is radical enough to be the basis for distinguishing two 
kinds of information: classical information (which requires a carrier signal for transmission) and 
quantum information (which does not) (possibility suggested by Jeffrey Bub, personal 
communication). Again, since names are conventional, there is no contradiction in this proposal. 
However it would lead us to the uncomfortable consequence that a given source would generate 
different kinds of information with no change in its own nature: the fact that a source generates 
classical or quantum information would depend not on itself but on the fact of how the messages 
will be encoded later. In other words, we could not decide whether a source generates classical or 
quantum information by only considering it; moreover, if the kind of coding to be used at the 
coding stage were not decided yet, the nature, classical or quantum, of the information generated by 
the source would be indeterminate. If these conclusions are to be avoided, conceiving a single kind 
of information, which can be encoded and transmitted in different ways, seems to be a more 
reasonable alternative. 
When the idea of two kinds of information is left aside, the physical interpretation of the 
concept of information faces a new challenge: to retain the idea of information as a physical 
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magnitude, but without requiring a physical carrier and without falling into a mere epistemic view. 
What is needed, therefore, is to give support to the idea that what happens at the source causes what 
happens at the destination, but with a concept of causality that does not rely on physical interactions 
or space-time lines connections. In particular, causality cannot be conceived in terms of energy flow 
(Fair 1979, Castañeda 1984), physical processes (Russell 1948, Dowe 1992), or property 
transference (Ehring 1997, Kistler 1998). Perhaps good candidates for conceptualizing the 
informational links from a non-epistemic stance are the manipulability theories of causation, 
according to which causes are to be regarded as devices for manipulating effects (Price 1991, 
Menzies and Price 1993, Woodward 2003). The rough idea is that, if C is genuinely a cause of E, 
then if one can manipulate C in the right way, this should be a way of manipulating or changing E 
(for an introduction, and also criticisms, see Woodward 2013). The view of causation as 
manipulability is widespread among statisticians, theorists of experimental design and many social 
and natural scientists, as well as in causal modeling. In the present context we are not interested in 
discussing whether this is the correct or the best theory of causation in general, or whether it can 
account for all the possible situations usually conceived as causation. Here it suffices to notice that 
the manipulability view may be particularly useful to elucidate the concept of information, given 
that “[t]he fundamental problem of communication is that of reproducing at one point either exactly 
or approximately a message selected at another point.” (Shannon 1948, p. 379). This view blocks 
situations like those of the two correlated receivers as cases of information transmission; but, at the 
same time, it admits cases in which there is a certain control of what happens in the destination end 
by means of actions at the source end, in spite of the absence of any physical signal between the two 
extremes of the communication arrangement. 
10.- Concluding remarks 
In the present paper we have developed different arguments to show that there are no reasons to 
consider that there exists quantum information as qualitatively different than Shannon information. 
There is only one kind of information, which can be coded by means of orthogonal or non-
orthogonal states. The analogy between Shannon’s theory and Schumacher’s theory is confined to 
coding theorems. The attempt to extend the analogy beyond this original scope leads to a concept of 
quantum information that becomes indistinguishable from that of quantum state. But information is 
essentially linked with communication, as it is clear in both Shannon’s and Schumacher’s 
proposals. If we detach information from this link, we are not talking about information but about 
quantum mechanics.  
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This conclusion stands in the same line as that of Duwell, when he audaciously claimed that 
“[q]uantum information does not exist” (2003, p. 479). Regrettably, later he changes his mind under 
the influence of Timpson’s works (Duwell 2008). In this new trend, he introduces a questionable 
distinction between the success of communication and the goal of communication in order to 
preserve the relevance of the distinction type-token in the discussion about the nature of information 
(see criticisms in Lombardi, Fortin and López 2014). 
Here we have also stressed the neutrality of information with respect to the physical theories 
that describe the systems used for its implementation. This view opens the way towards a non-
reductive unification of physics: if different physical theories can be reconstructed on the same 
neutral informational basis, they could be meaningfully compared with no need of searching for 
reductive links among them. 
Finally, we have argued that, although not by introducing a new kind of information, the 
irruption of quantum mechanics in the theoretical domain of information has deep consequences 
regarding the concept itself. In fact, the possibility of transmission of information without signal 
carrier in the transposition stage represents a strong challenge for the physical interpretation of 
information. The physical view is forced to find new explanations for information transmission, 
which gives up the need of a physical carrier between transmitter and receiver without falling in 
mere correlation. We have suggested that a manipulability theory of causation could serve to this 
conceptual purpose; but this will be the subject of a future research. 
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